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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 970411-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1988), this Court 
held that a supplemental verdict-urging instruction to a jury 
that has begun deliberations was proper if the language was not 
inherently coercive or coercive under the specific circumstances 
of the case. The language of the jury instruction in this case 
was coercive per se because the court admonished the jury that 
they had to render a verdict. The instruction was also coercive 
under the specific circumstances of the case because of the lack 
of counterbalancing instructions and because deliberations after 
the instruction resulted in a guilty verdict after a mere five 
minutes. Accordingly, the defendant asserts that the 
supplemental instructions given by the trial court were coercive 




TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE PER SE 
Rule 19 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits 
appellate review for erroneous instructions if an objection was 
made at trial or "in order to avoid a manifest injustice." 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 19(c)(1982). In the present case, the defendant 
was not given the opportunity to object to the jury instructions 
because the trial court invited the jury into the courtroom and 
commenced the instructions without warning the defendant. 
This Court in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 
1988) held that "[w]here counsel is not aware of the contents of 
such an instruction, failure to object to it prior to its being 
given to the jury should not bar consideration of the charge on 
appeal." Appellee has conceded that this matter is properly 
before the court pursuant to the holding in Lactod (Br. Of 
Appellee at 2). Accordingly, this Court should review the trial 
court's use of verdict-urging instruction to the jury in the 
present case. 
The instructions that are in dispute are as follows: 
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now in the matter of 
State versus Steven Clements. Both counsel are present, as 
is Mr. Clements. We have invited the six members of the 
jury to come into the court. Members of the jury, have you 
been able to arrive at a verdict? And who is your 
foreperson? 
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be. 
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THE COURT: Okay, then. Mr. Hall, you are the 
foreperson, and has the jury been able to arrive at a 
verdict on each count, sir? 
THE COURT: Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has been 
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my 
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar 
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict 
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday, 
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while 
you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you 
need to to arrive at a verdict. 
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think 
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you 
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can 
unanimously agree on a verdict on each count. 
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in for two 
minutes. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will 
have you brought back out in five minutes, then. If you 
can't then we will have to figure out something else to do. 
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this 
evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one 
real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or 
"no." You have to make up your minds, folks. So we'll have 
you brought out again in five minutes, then. 
(Transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39). 
The trial court's instructions are in the form of an "Allen 
charge" or a verdict-urging instruction that was approved by the 
United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 
492, 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896). In Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, this Court 
upheld the non-coercive use of Allen charges. However, this 
Court also recognized that although Allen charges are 
permissible, they must not be coercive per se or coercive under 
the specific circumstances of the case. 
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The coercive potential of Allen charges threatens the 
principle of law that "[e]very defendant in a federal criminal 
case has the right to have his guilt found, if found at all, only 
by the unanimous verdict of a jury of his peers." U.S. v. Thomas, 
449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Circuit 1971). The D.C. Circuit asserted 
that "[a]ny undue intrusion by the trial judge into this 
exclusive province of the jury is error of the first magnitude." 
id. at 1181. 
The supplemental jury instruction in the present case was 
coercive per se because the court insisted that the jury reach a 
verdict. In Lactod, this Court asserted that "there are certain 
inherently coercive ideas which should not be included in an 
Allen charge." 761 P.2d at 31. Furthermore, "[t]he United 
States Supreme Court [has] expressly disapproved an instruction 
which stated, in part that x[y]ou have got to reach a decision in 
this case.' Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446, 85 S.Ct. at 1060." Lactod, 
761 P.2d at 31. 
The D.C. Circuit in Thomas similarly contended that "in 
much the same category is the admonition in this case that "you 
have ought to be able to agree on a verdict." 449 F.2d at 1182-
83. The court found that "[s]tatements of this sort reflect the 
judge's assessment that the factual issues bear relatively easy 
resolution, and pressure jurors, who in their own endeavors have 
not found it so, to come to some result at all costs." Id. 
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In the present case, the trial court used language that was 
inherently coercive. The court told the jury that "I would 
sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this evening. This 
is not a complicated case. There's only one real issue here on 
the one count, and it's either 'yes' or 'no.' You have to make 
up your minds, folks" (Tr. at 139). The court's insistence that 
the jury "make up [their] minds" and decide "yes" or "no" had the 
effect of instructing the jury to reach a verdict. 
The trial court's statement that "This is not a complicated 
case" reflected the court's opinion that facts were easily 
determined and placed improper pressure on the jurors(Tr. at 
138). The statements of the court instructed the jury that it 
had to reach a decision and were coercive per se. 
Appellee contends that it is proper to instruct a non-
deadlocked jury that they must return a verdict (Appellee's brief 
at 16-18). However, the Third Circuit insisted that demanding a 
verdict is never appropriate. In U.S. v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 
407, 416 (3rd Cir. 1962), the court responded to the Allen charge 
given by the trial judge to the jury before jury deliberations by 
asserting that: 
So long as the unanimous verdict is required in 
criminal cases, there will always be three possible 
decisions of the jury: 
(1) not guilty of any charge; 
(2) guilty of one or more counts of the indictment; and 
5 
(3) not verdict because of a lack of unanimity. 
The possibility of a hung jury is as much a part of our 
jury unanimity schema as are verdicts of guilty or not 
guilty. And although dictates of sound judicial 
administration tend to encourage the rendition of 
verdicts rather than suffer the experience of hung 
juries, nevertheless, it is a cardinal principle of law 
that a trial judge may not coerce a jury to the extent 
of demanding that they return a verdict'' (emphasis 
added). 
This Court in Lactod also stated that a supplemental 
instruction "^should not overemphasize the importance of an 
agreement, suggest any juror surrender his independent judgment, 
or say or do anything from which the jury could possibly infer 
that the court is indicating anxiety for or demanding some 
verdict, or subjecting the jury to the hardships of long 
deliberations.'" Lactod, 761 P.2d at 32 (quoting State v. Thomas, 
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959)) (emphasis added). 
The court in this case expressed its anxiety for a verdict 
by urging the jury to "make up [their] minds" and by stating that 
he sincerely hoped that the jury would reach a verdict that 
evening (Tr. at 138-9). 
In Powell v. U.S., 297 F.2d 318, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1961), the 
court found prejudicial error in the trial court's admonishment 
"that if the jury remembered the evidence and heeded the charge 
of the court, it ought to be able to agree upon a verdict." The 
court maintained that the charge "is not supported by any law 
which is brought before us." id. at 320-21. In this case the 
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judge made a similar charge by insisting that the case was not 
complicated and that there was only one issue, which could be 
answered by "yes" or "no" (Tr. at 138-9). Accordingly, the 
defendant maintains that the coercive language of the court 
placed pressure on the jury to return a verdict. The prejudice 
created against the defendant by the coercive instruction 
requires reversal by this Court. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE COERCIVE UNDER THE SPECIFIC 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 
Supplemental charges to juries are also reviewed under the 
specific circumstances for an improper coercive effect. Jenkins 
v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam), State v. 
Lactod,761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1988). The circumstances and 
context of the Allen charge in this case demonstrate that the 
charge was coercive. The factors that the Lactod court 
considered included "any colloquy between the judge and jury 
foreman, circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, 
and American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice 
Relating to Trial by Jury." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31. 
A colloquy that a judge found to be prejudicial occurred in 
Brvan v. State, 280 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. App. 1973). Chief Judge 
Rawls specially concurred in the decision because he did not 
agree with the majority that the use of the Allen charge was 
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always prejudicial. Id. He maintained that the "facts 
surrounding the giving of the charge must be considered." Id. 
Chief Judge Rawls found that the colloquy between the judge 
and the jury, which was given a few minutes after the jury had 
begun deliberations again after receiving the Allen charge, 
established prejudice. The colloquy is as follows: 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury do you 
believe that you can arrive at a verdict in a short period 
of time? 
JUROR: I believe we're closer to it than we were. I 
have that idea. 
THE COURT: If I give you another 20 minutes, will that 
be enough? You want to give it a try for 20 minutes? 
JUROR: All right. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll give you another 20 
minutes and see if you can arrive at a verdict within the 
next 20 minutes. You can retire to the jury room/7 
Bryan, 280 So.2d at 27. Seventeen minutes after this exchange, 
the jury returned its guilty verdict. id. Chief Judge Rawls 
asserted that these facts persuaded him to determine that the 
Allen charge constituted prejudicial error. Id. 
The colloquy of that case bears a striking resemblance to 
the colloquy in the present case. In this case the judge asked 
the judge whether they would not be able to reach a verdict that 
evening and would like to reconvene in a week (Tr. at 138). The 
jury foreman replied "Some of us think we should go back in for 
two minutes." The court then excused the jury for five minutes 
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(Tr. at 138). The exchange between the judge and the jury 
foreman was similar to the colloquy that Chief Judge Rawls found 
to be prejudicial in Bryan. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 
(Utah 1992), found that the verdict-urging instruction at issue 
there was not coercive under specific circumstances of the case 
that are not present in this case. In Brown, the court found 
that the instruction was not coercive because the "charge was 
given prior to jury deliberations and the instruction 
specifically directed the jurors not to give up their own 
conscientious conclusions". 
The present case can be distinguished from Brown because the 
instructions were not given prior to jury deliberations.1 They 
were given two hours after jury deliberations had begun. Also, 
in this case, the judge failed to counterbalance the verdict-
urging with the specific instruction for the jurors to not give 
up their own conscientious conclusions. 
The court in Lactod also considered comments that 
counterbalanced a verdict-urging instruction as a factor in 
determining whether the instruction was coercive. Lacjtod, 761 
P. 2d at 30-31. In Lactod, the trial judge counterbalanced 
The American Bar Association also recommends that verdict-
urging instructions are given before the jury retires for 
deliberation. American Bar Association Standards Relating to Trial 
by Jury, §5.4(a). 
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statements that indicated he and the jury had spent a lot of time 
on the case and that he did not have another day to spend on the 
case with statements that encouraged jurors to hold on to their 
conscientiously held beliefs, id. at 31. Counterbalancing 
statements are not present in the instructions of this case. The 
court simply instructed the jury to make up their minds and then 
dismissed them. 
The court in Lactod also observed that the jury deliberated 
for another hour and fifteen minutes after receiving the 
instruction. The court considered the length of time as one of 
the circumstances to evaluate in assessing whether the 
instruction was coercive. 761 P.2d at 31. The jury in the 
present case took only five minutes after the instruction to 
return a verdict in contrast to the jury in Lactod.2 
Another circumstance that the Lactod court noted was the 
absence of a threat to keep the jury deliberating for an 
unreasonable length of time. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31. In the 
present case, the trial court recommended that the jury 
2
 Although Appellee contends that five minutes indicate the 
jury was very close to a verdict when the court interrupted 
deliberations, this is not supported by the facts (Appellee's brief 
at 15) . The jury did not indicate that they were close to a 
verdict when they were called back in. The foreperson just said 
that "some of us think that we should go back in for two minute.'' 
(T. at 138) . Appellee also contradicts the assertion that the 
short deliberation time suggests the jury was close to a decision 
prior to the Allen charge by later stating that "there is no way of 
knowing how close to, a verdict the jury was when they were called 
in." (Appellee's brief at p. 22). 
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deliberate for an indefinite amount of time (Tr. at 138). The 
court in this case proposed that the jury recess and reconvene a 
week later to deliberate for "as long as [the jury needed] to to 
arrive at a verdict." (Tr. at 138). The court in Fields v. 
State, 487 P.2d 831, 839 (Alaska 1971), asserted that "[f]or a 
jury to be faced with the prospect of indefinite service is so 
inherently and invariably coercive as to require reversal." 
The State contends that the trial court's statements were 
administrative in nature, such as the statements in Andrews v. 
State, 794 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1990). However, 
Andrews is distinct from the present case because the 
communication of the court in Andrews to the jury regarded 
practical arrangements for overnight accommodations.3 The 
instructions in that case "did not amount to an additional 
instruction upon the law or some phase of the case." Ld. at 48. 
The court in the present case did instruct the jury on the law 
3
 The trial court submitted the following written communication 
to the jury: "The law of Texas provides that once the Court's 
charge has been presented to the jury, the jury can no longer 
separate until it has been discharged. Unfortunately, Bowie County 
does not have accomodations (sic) for jurors to remain overnight. 
The Bailiff will give each of you a pad upon you which you 
will please list the one you wish to contact and any articles you 
may want the sheriff to secure for you at your homes. 
Again, unfortunately, I have trials scheduled for tomorrow and 
we may not be able to resume until Monday. So, in completing your 
list, please take this into consideration so that the sheriff can 
take care of your needs in one trip, if possible." id. at 47-8. 
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and even asserted that "[t]here's only one real issue on the one 
count, and it's either xyes' or 'no'" (Transcript at 138-9). 
The specific circumstances of this case, which include the 
colloquy between the judge and the jury, the lack of 
counterbalancing instructions, the short length of jury 
deliberations following the charge, and the threat to the jury of 
deliberating for an indefinite amount of time, support the 
conclusion that the instruction was coercive. For the foregoing 
reasons, the conviction of Appellant should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Clements asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Open Container because 
the trial court's Allen instruction to the jury was both coercive 
per se and coercive under the specific circumstances of this 
case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this iC day of May, 1998. 
Margaret P. Lindsay/ 
Counsel for Clements 
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